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Party  system  institutionalization  has  been  extensively  studied  in  the  political  science
scholarship,  however  semi-presidentialism which saw the resurgence  of  interest  among
transitional countries, and as a result also in academia at the end of the 1990s, remains
loosely  treated  in  the  relevant  literature.  Even  the  studies  which  include  semi-
presidentialism as a regime type, tend to overlook the significant institutional differences
within semi-presidentialism. 
The  aim  of  the  current  paper  is  to  contribute  to  the  understanding  of  party  systems
institutionalization in semi-presidential countries by discriminating between two sub-types
within  the  regime  which  create  distinct  institutional  arrangements,  systems  of
accountability, and incentives for the parties involved in this system.
Underlying assumption behind this research is that the shift from president-parliamentary
to the premier-presidential system produces increased institutionalization in party systems,
based on the  more  individual-centric  design  of  the  first  sub-type  and the  more  party-
oriented premier-presidential system in the second.
By mapping out the differences within the semi-presidential regime the paper also tries to
refine the existing measurement of the party system institutionalization, in order to better
account for the systematic character of interactions between parties in this regime.
In order to test the hypothesis five countries which underwent the shift from president-
parliamentarism to premier-presidneitalism are examined in this study. In terms of research
design, the case selection employed here will permit a study of the effects of regime type
on party system institutionalization, since all five cases had underdeveloped party systems
at a time of constitutional amendment that brought semi-presidentialism.
The results largely support the hypothesis, four of five cases showed increased levels of
PSI after the shift to premier-presidentialism, while one case deviated.
Based  on  the  empirical  results,  conclusion  is  drawn  that  under-institutionalized  party
systems under president-parliamentarism, will improve their performance if they switch to
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The idea that the constitutional structure influences party politics (see Samuels & Shugart
2010: 10, 3) is almost as old as the first attempt at defining semi-presidentialism. Both of
these studies can be traced back to the same author, Maurice Duverger. Although party
systems  have  been  of  great  interest  to  numerous  scholars  and  are  still  examined
extensively, arguably, more exhaustively among Western European countries and less so in
the  Eastern  Europe  and  the  former  Soviet  bloc, interest  in  semi-presidentialism  has
remained rather limited. Despite the renewal of interest in this regime at the end of the
1990s which led to refinement  of the concept  and finally  refinement  of reliability  and
validity  issues  by Robert  Elgie,  semi-presidential  countries  are  still  grouped under  the
“pure” regimes,  ignoring or disregarding the merits  of inclusion of this  regime type in
understanding  institutional  outcomes  produced  by  different  regimes.  I  argue  that
differentiation between two sub-types of semi-presidentialism will shed some light on the
lagging of institutionalization in some of the selected countries. This, on the other hand,
will  help  us  clarify  or  manage  our  expectations  regarding  PSI  under  each  sub-type
generally, or even allow us to give recommendations regarding institutional design in order
to achieve higher degree of party system institutionalization.
On rare occasions scholars have addressed the issue of influence of all three regime type
on party system institutionalization, only to point to the “perils of semi-presidentialism” in
relation to PSI in [newly] democratizing countries (see, for instance, Casal Bértoa 2014a,
2014b). Existing studies on party systems where semi-presidentialism is used separately
from presidential and parliamentary systems, it is treated as a single variable analogous to
the “pure” regimes. The research is mostly carried out based on cross-country analysis.
Whereas,  the  current  paper  accounts  for  the  significant  institutional  differences  within
semi-presidentialism,  which  can  be  classified  under  two  sub-types:  president-
parliamentarism (PP1) and premier-presidentialism (PP2). The focus of the paper is the
shift from the one (more individual-centric) sub-type to the other (more party-centric one).
Based on the conceptualization of party systems by Peter Mair, it is proposed in this paper
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that the shift in semi-presidentialism produces increase in the level of institutionalization in
party systems.
The structure of the thesis is as follows: chapter one gives an account of how the notion of
semi-presidentialism evolved  in  the  political  science  scholarship.  Then turns  to  the  so
called “three waves of semi-presidential studies” (Elgie 2015). This sub-section serves the
purpose  of  placing  the  current  study  in  the  proper  category  of  the  semi-presidential
scholarship, and furthermore, gives the research a context. Once context is clarified and the
shortcomings of the prior attempts at defining semi-presidentialism are established, Elgie’s
conceptual framework is introduced which offers a dichotomous treatment of the regime.
While  one  sub-type  promotes  more  party-centric  politics,  the  other  creates  tensions
between branches which leads to sacrificing the interest of parties.
Focus  of  the  chapter  two  is  the  dependent  variable,  party  system  institutionalization.
Similar to the previous chapter different approaches to understanding party systems are
reviewed for the purposes of finding compatible approach to the aim of the current study.
The “numbers of parties” and the “government formation” approaches are dismissed in
favor of Mair, and Mair and Casal Bértoa’s conceptual framework, that traces the core of
party system to the “structure of inter-party competition” for government.
Electoral systems serve as a conditional variable. Depending on the electoral design effects
of semi-presidential sub-types can be increased or hindered.
In order to test the claim of semi-presidential system sub-types having the proposed effect
on the party system institutionalization, factor-oriented research is employed in the study.
The rationale  behind the choice  of  factor-oriented  research  is  that  it  is  best  suited for
studying the way changes in the independent variable produce changes in the dependent
variable  (Gschwend & Schimmelfennig 2007: 7-8). Thus, the current study offers a cross-
temporal analysis of cases in order to observe whether there is a hypothesized increase in
the  degree  of  PSI  corresponding  to  the  shift  from president-parliamentary  to  premier-
presidential  system.  To  this  end,  five  countries  which  at  a  time  of  constitutional
amendment had under-institutionalized party systems and underwent a shift from the first
sub-type to the more party-centric premier-presidential system, are examined in the study.
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These countries  are:  Croatia,  Georgia,  Portugal, São Tomé and Príncipe,  and Ukraine.
Final selection of cases leaves us with countries, which are the products of different waves
of democratization, with different socio-economic development, different electoral rules in
place.  What  they  have  in  common is  the  regime type  and the  fact  that  each  of  these
countries  underwent  a  shift  from president-parliamentarism  to  premier-presidentialism.
This certainly gives the present study a certain advantage, not only to observe the evolution
of party system institutionalization under semi-presidentialism but also to test whether the
same results  can  be  expected  under  different  circumstances/  environments,  at  least  in
electoral democracies.
Empirical  analysis  illustrates  how  different  features  of  each  sub-type  are  manifest  in
individual  cases.  Inter-branch  tension  and  president’s  divergent  agenda  under  PP1  in
Portugal, further closure of the access to government after the shift to PP2 among cases
which had strongly party-centric system under both sub-types and the initial stabilization





2.1.1 The evolution of the notion
The scholarship on the subject is relatively new. To put it into perspective, it leaves us with
more than a century of discrepancy between the regime on the ground and the resolution of
methodological problems in research. This new type of political system was introduced by
Maurice Duverger (1980 (the English version)) in an academic context (Elgie 1999: 1),
who  studied  the  distinct  nature  of  the  French  fifth  republic.  Peculiarity  of  the  'semi-
presidential government', as observed at a time (keeping in mind that before the 1990s only
a  handful  of  countries  have  adopted  semi-presidential  constitution),  was  that  it
incorporated  popularly  elected  president  along with the government  accountable  to  the
assembly  (Duverger  1980:  165).  These  "borrowed"  characteristics  from  the  “pure”
presidential  and  parliamentary  systems  has  led  to  two  major  shortcomings  in  the
scholarship. The first is the unconventional treatment of this regime type, and the second is
the conceptual confusion regarding semi-presidentialism. To expend on the latter point, it
[semi-presidentialism] is sometimes referred to as a mixed or a hybrid regime or even as a
synthesis  of the two “pure” systems. Such a loose treatment  of the concept  has led to
misunderstandings in popular as well as scholarly articles as to how this system works and
what should be expected from the political  actors operating under such an institutional
arrangement.  Furthermore,  the  most  important  shortcoming  of  the  scholarship  was  the
unresolved  reliability  and  validity  issues  inherited  from  the  ambiguous  conceptual
framework. Despite these serious challenges the Duvergerian basic definition of the system
(directly elected president, and PM and cabinet accountable to the assembly) has withstood
this scrutiny, while scholars have revised and improved certain conceptual and operational
aspects of this definition.
When Duverger  initiated  the study of this  new 'government  model',  only a handful  of
countries had adopted semi-presidential constitutions, which made it an ever harder task to
formulate a general conceptual framework that would apply equally to all cases, including
the future ones. Nevertheless, Duverger correctly identified the foundation of the concept,
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and  significant  variations  within  the  system  which  required  introduction  of  sub-types
within  semi-presidentialism,  based  on  the  empirics.  The  only  shortcoming  Duverger's
model  had  was  that  it  was  based  on  president's  "quite  considerable  powers",  his/her
position vis-a-vis the assembly majority, and other circumstantial aspects (Duverger 1980:
165  –  166,  177).  In  short,  it  was  a  strictly  behavioral  approach  and  slightly  over-
complicated model which left a lot to the judgment of individual scholars who would pick
up the Duvergerian conceptualization to apply to their own study.
The single most important contribution to the concept of semi-presidentialism came from
Robert Elgie in the late 1990s. By this time the number of semi-presidential countries had
risen significantly. He observed that "quite considerable powers" in Duverger's definition
made it difficult to replicate studies and also, led to a further problem of endogeneity. In
order to rid the concept of these shortcomings Elgie shifted the focus from a behavioral to
the  strictly  constitutional/  institutional  approach.  Furthermore,  and coming  back to  the
unconventional  treatment  of  semi-presidentialism,  mentioned  above,  by  removing
president’s "powers" from the definition, Elgie made it possible for semi-presidentialism to
be  treated  the  same  way  as  presidentialism  and  parliamentarism  (see  Elgie  2011:  2).
Although, Elgie removed 'quite considerable powers' from the conceptualization, he still
built upon Duverger's original definition. Although, it still  proved extremely difficult to
exorcise semi-presidentialism from presidential powers altogether. Elgie (2005) still came
back to the “presidential powers” in his later work when he revisited semi-presidential sub-
types. Moreover, he also maintained the assembly-president relation in his work, albeit an
altered version. Originally, Duverger argued that the existence of an assembly majority had
an influence over the president's practical powers (Duverger 1980: 182). So much so that
this aspect would also be able to cause a shift in the sub-type of semi-presidentialism. In
this  sense,  Duvergerian  classification  of  semi-presidentialism  was  also  more  fluid.  To
some  extent  Elgie  incorporates  an  aspect  of  "composition  of  parliamentary  majority"
feature  and the  president's  position  in  terms of  the  assembly  majority  by emphasizing
president's  partisanship  under  the  president-parliamentary  system  and  his/her  non-
partisanship under the premier-presidential system.
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2.1.2 Categorizing semi-presidential studies
It  was  only  in  the  1990's  that  semi-presidentialism  really  gained  momentum  both  in
academia and also on the ground. With the resurgence of interest in this model among
transitional  countries it  became clear  that the old conceptual framework (based on five
cases/ countries) fell short of a proposal of clear definition that would allow scholars to
classify countries homogeneously. It can be argued that it was the rise in the number of
semi-presidential countries which made conceptual revision possible. Henceforth, the re-
conceptualization constituted the first of the three waves of semi-presidential scholarship.
Since majority of semi-presidential countries at a time were transitioning to democracy,
scholars started looking into the effects of the regime on democratic performance in these
countries.  And  the  final  wave  concentrates  on  the  way  in  which  semi-presidential
institutional design affects “the political process”. In addition, the focus of this wave has
been the governmental arena (see Elgie 2015), which connects the core of the dependent
variable to this wave nicely. The reasons of which will become clear in the sub-chapter 2,
which examines party system institutionalization.
2.1.3 Elgie's conceptual framework
The above overview of the literature on semi-presidentialism served four purposes: first, to
see where the current study fits into the literature regarding semi-presidentialism;  second,
to get a sense of where contribution to the current debate on the topic is possible; thirdly, to
establish a link or a common ground between the independent and the dependent variables.
In  the  same  vein,  the  current  study  appears  to  be  a  part  of  the  third  wave  of  semi-
presidential studies. And the fourth objective, which was more general, was to figure out
which definition suits the aims of this study best, and also how to avoid making critical
research mistakes produced by careless conceptualization.
For the current study I employ Elgie’s conceptual framework, where semi-presidentialism
refers to a system in which: “a constitution makes provision for both a  directly elected
fixed-term president and a prime minister and cabinet who are collectively responsible to
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the legislature” (Elgie 1999: 13) (emphasis added). This proposition of conceptualization
is praised in the scholarship for its “minimalist  institutional  definition”,  which resolves
prior  Duvergerian  ambiguity  (see,  for  instance,  Schleiter  & Morgan-Jones  2010;  Casal
Bértoa 2014a; Casal Bértoa 2014b, etc.). Certainly, in Elgie’s definition, classification of
the regime does not depend on the behavioral aspects rather the key differentiating features
from other types of regime can be found in constitutions. Four aspects should be kept in
mind  when  classifying  countries  as  semi-presidential  ones:  (1)  the  origin  and  (2)  the
survival of the president; and (3) the origin and (4) the survival of the prime minister and
the cabinet. In the case of the president, the origin – direct elections, and the survival –
fixed  office  term,  comes  from the  popular  elections;  or  from  the  people.  Hence,  the
president is independent of the assembly [in this regard]. The new dimension brought by
the direct-election of the president into the game, is worth noting. It changes dynamics in
the assembly-president relations. Under the circumstances when the president is partisan,
this separate survival (of president) removes constraints on the president to defect from
party politics/  policies  and to  pursue his/her  own agenda,  even if  elected  on the same
grounds as his/her party (Samuels & Shugart 2010: 29, 38). However, “the same grounds”
do not necessarily translate into the overlapping platforms. An important principle which
can lead to the defection of presidents from their parties is the asymmetry of presidential
and parties' electoral platforms. The former is thought to have wider platform in general
compared to that of [their] parties (Schleiter & Morgan-Jones 2009: 669).
Although the above conceptualization is unambiguous for the classification purposes due
to its focus on the origin and survival of the president instead of his/her actual powers, this
definition alone is not sufficient in accounting of the effects produced by the institutional
differences within semi-presidential systems (closely follows Elgie 2015: 5–6). It has been
established  (see  Roper  2002)  that  the  variations  within  semi-presidentialism  affect
institutional outcomes, such as cabinet in|stability. Scholars have proposed different ways
of differentiating between the types of semi-presidential systems; some have focused on
presidential  powers  and  arrived  at  three  sub-types:  highly  presidential,  balanced  and
parliamentary (Elgie 2005). However, in order to avoid falling into the same Duvergerian
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trap with regard to presidential  powers, for the current study I will apply Samuels and
Shugart’s origin and survival, especially the latter, of the prime minister and the cabinet as
a differentiating factor between the sub-types of semi-presidnetialism. The rationale behind
this choice is that the selection bias is avoided by tracing the institutional differences of
this system in the constitution. Although the PM and the cabinet are accountable to the
assembly according to Elgie’s definition above, under certain conditions survival can also
depend on the president, this is the instance of president-parliamentarism (PP1 sub-type)
(Elgie 2011).  As long as the president has “control over the distribution of the spoils of
office  and/or  the  policy  process,  party  behavior  and  organization  will  tend  to  mimic
constitutional  structure,  giving  rise  to  “presidentialized” parties”  (Samuels  & Shugart
2010: 15–16, 25, 29–30). When presidents have control over the distribution of the spoils
of office, do not depend on the assembly for survival and also their agenda differs from
that of their party platform, then the incentive to remain loyal to the party in terms of
portfolio allocations is to be less expected. It is more likely that president in this system
will assign ministerial posts to technocrats who would follow the president's agenda and
not push the party’s interests. Thus, it can be argued, that the directly elected president
brings a  zero-sum component  into the system (Elgie  2007:  56).  However,  as  much as
presidential defection from the party platform has to be tolerated, defection from the prime
ministers can be punished from both sides, which would put partisan PMs into impossible
position  under  the  government  formed  by  presidential  influence.  This  sub-type  is
characterized by dual accountability, which does not exclude parties completely. In light of
the  tension  between  president’s  and  parties’  agendas  higher  frequency  of  government
alternation can be expected, as the government performance is scrutinized from both sides.
Due to lack of incentives for inter-branch cooperation alternation between technocratic and
party-centric governments can be expected (Elgie 2011: 2).
Slightly  different  institutional  arrangement  is  observed  under  premier-presidentialism
(PP2),  where “the prime minister  and cabinet  are collectively” accountable only to the
assembly  (Elgie  2011:  28  (following  Shugart  & Carey  1992)).  This  leads  to  different
outcomes  from  that  of  PP1.  In  contrast  to  PP1,  under  PP2  necessary  conditions  for
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presidentialization of parties is missing (Samuels & Shugart 2010:43). The focus is shifted
from presidents to the assembly, to parties. By removing incentives for presidentialisation
of political process sources of government instability are capped. In the first place, inter-
branch competing agendas are no longer at the forefront of government re-formulation.
And moreover, non-partisan, presidentialized cabinets should also be removed from the
equation as the survival of cabinet belong to the assembly, exclusively and the president
does not have the power to play tit-for-tat with the assembly.
Not only is the partisan composition expected to be partisan under PP2, but also this aspect
due to the accountability structure is set to increase legislative control over the executive
(Elgie 2011). As opposed to PP1, where non-partisan technocrats further contribute to the
indifference to party politics.
Below, I present the two sub-types of semi-presidentialism: president-parliamentary (PP1)
and premier-presidential (PP2) systems.1
Table; key features of semi-presidential sub-types
System type President-parliamentarism Premier-presidentialism
President Directly elected, fixed term Directly elected, fixed term
Gov’t, PM 
accountable to




Party loyalty President can defect, no fear of 
dismissal from the assembly
PM can be dismissed by the 
assembly, (exclusively)
Incentives Maximization of presidential and 
parliamentary interests
Primacy of the assembly
Source: Elgie et al. 2011
Hence, based on the institutional differences and divergent incentives emerging from the
two sub-types of semi-presidentialism, it is more likely to witness presidentialization and
individual-centric politics under president-parliamentary system, with higher frequency of
change in government. In contrast, under premier-presidential system more party-oriented
1  abbreviation coined by Robert Elgie in the data-set for semi-
presidentialism.
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approach  and  more  stability  in  government  is  to  be  expected.  To  put  this  theoretical
discussion in perspective I propose the following hypothesis:
PSI increases when country moves from PP1 to PP2. (corresponding countries’ move from
PP1 to PP2)
To  sum  up  the  discussion  regarding  semi-presidentialism,  in  order  to  turn  semi-
presidentialism into a useful category for comparison to account for systemic differences
within  semi-presidentialism  is  paramount.  Thus,  the  independent  variable,  semi-
presidentialism  was  dichotomized  as  president-parliamentary  (PP1)  and  as  premier-
presidential  (PP2) systems.  This  provides  with the ground to compare and account  for
differences  within  semi-presidentialism  and  the  effects  of  these  two  sub-types  on  the
institutional  outcomes  (Elgie  2009:  161-163;  Figure  5).  the  two  sub-types  under
consideration in this study, emerge from the differences in the “collective accountability”
of  the  PM  and  the  cabinet  which  is  derived  from  the  constitution  (Elgie  2011:  28).
Moreover,  these  institutional  differences  are  directly  connected  to  the  variation  in  the
dependent  variable  –  party  system institutionalization,  which  will  be  explained  in  the
following section.
2.2 Understanding PSI
2.2.1 The numbers approach
There is a tendency in the scholarship on party system institutionalization (PSI) to propose
different ways to classify party systems. But the conceptual part of what constitutes a party
system and its institutionalization proper, has been somewhat overlooked. PSI is a multi-
dimensional  phenomenon and it  is  this  multi-layered nature of the party system which
draws all the attention sometimes at the expense of definition of the concept itself (see
Casal Bértoa 2017). That said, the concept 'party system' implies the notion of interactions
between "the set of parties" (Mainwaring & Torcal 2006: 205). The numerical character of
the definition became a cornerstone in understanding party systems in the early phase of
scholarship  on  the  subject.  In  fact,  particular  parties  became  the  party  system in  this
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approach (Bardi & Mair 2008: 153). In discriminating between different types of party
systems,  scholars  starting  with  Duverger  have  mostly  focused their  attention  on  some
variation of "the number of parties in competition". Thus, one of the most commonly used
approaches in studies regarding party systems was and still remains the numbers of parties
approach.
One of the key contributors of this approach was Sartori who brought interactions between
parties to the forefront of thinking about party systems by adding ideological dimension to
the simple numbers-of-parties calculus. In this sense, his classification of party systems has
two dimensions:  number  of competing parties and  ideological  distance  (Mainwaring &
Torcal 2006; Mair 1996). However, the way Sartori designed his framework, these two
factors were there to discriminate  between fully institutionalized or "consolidated party
systems and non-systems".  Henceforth,  PSI was a  dichotomous  variable  in  his  theory.
Sartori was criticized for categorizing party systems this way. Mainwaring & Torcal (2006:
205 – 206) contended that dichotomy did not quite account for the systemic nature of party
systems which implies  "some pattern  in  inter-party competition".  Thus,  when studying
party systems it is more useful to look into the varying degrees of institutionalization, and
the types of variations these differences in the level of institutionalization bring about in
the structure of inter-party competition.
Depending on one's understanding of party systems, the factors which affect the degree of
institutionalization also vary. In the 'numbers of parties' approach changes in the electoral
rules are linked to changes in the number of parties in party system, since some rules result
in two party systems (plurality single member district) and others promote multi-partism
(proportional representation)  (e.g. Bielasiak 2002). However, Mair building on Sartori's
conceptual framework later demonstrated how change in the structure of competition in the
party system could also affect the "electoral preferences", not just vice versa. It can be
argued that Mair decoupled party systems from co-dependence on the electoral sphere by
demonstrating  that  electoral  changes  do  not  automatically  translate  into  party  system
alteration. What is more, the latter can change significantly without causing shifts in the
existing "structure of competition", i.e. patterns in party systems interactions (Mair 1996).
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Despite existing criticism, Sartori's improvement of the pure numbers calculus is notable in
the PSI literature.  By supplementing the 'numbers of parties'  approach with the second
dimension of ideological proximity, he enabled 1) discrimination between what constitutes
party system proper, independent from the influence of the electoral arena and 2) opened
the door for locating the competition within the party system in the  governmental arena
(see  Mair  1996).  It  was  around  this  framework  that  Mair  constructed  his  own
understanding  of  party  systems.  He  emphasized  that  the  parties  in  the  party  system
compete for the governing status. However, despite Mair’s alternative, improved study, the
'numbers  of  parties'  approach  is  still  quite  commonly  applied  in  the  party  systems
scholarship (e.g. Bielasiak 2002). The rationale behind bringing the 'numbers' back in has
been  explained  as  an  ineffectiveness  of  PSI  to  provide  useful  explanation  globally,
however useful it might be for party systems in developing countries (see Siaroff 2006).
In order to illustrate why this approach is not the right fit for the current study I have
introduced Peter Mair, and Mainwaring and Torcal's criticisms of Sartori's framework. The
latter, despite significantly improving simple 'numbers of parties' approach still falls short
of  providing a  meaningful  classification  for  the  party  systems in  practice  (Mair  1996;
Mainwaring & Torcal 2006).
2.2.2 The government formation approach
Another notable approach to understanding PSI was designed by Dahl. His contribution to
the scholarship came from the opposition perspective  and offered an alternative to the
numbers of parties approach. By tracing the center of the party system in opposition he
brought  government  formation  to  the  forefront  of  competition  in  party  systems  (Mair
1996).  This  approach  seems  more  relevant  in  the  current  study,  since  government
formation under semi-presidentialism follows a different logic than the "pure" presidential
and  parliamentary  systems  (see  Almeida  &  Cho  2007).  In  parliamentary  systems  the
executive is derived from the assembly. The origin as well as survival of the cabinet lies in
the assembly. Hence, the distribution of seats in government also depends on parliamentary
parties (Druckman & Roberts 2005: 536). It is safe to assume that cabinets consist mostly
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of partisan ministers in this system, as a general rule. On the contrary, non-partisan cabinet
members are quite common under presidentialism. As far as semi-presidential regimes go,
"elections designate assembly parties and the president as potential … principals of the
government" (Schleiter & Morgan-Jones 2010: 1418-1419). What this statement points to
is that government formation is not only party prerogative in this system. This approach
brings very actor-oriented understanding of government formation and secondly, and more
importantly, brings the presidential powers, to wit nomination powers, back in. As it has
already been established above, reversal to presidential powers should be avoided. On the
basis of incompatibility of this approach with the independent variable and also, due to
some tension vis-à-vis the core idea of the party system, this approach is also dismissed.
2.2.3 The structure of inter-party competition
Overview of the scholarship suggests that competition is the defining feature of the party
system. Mair's definition of the phenomenon stands out in the scholarship due to the fact
that he suggests the distinction between different types of party systems is to be found in
the "structure of inter-party competition" for government (Mair 1996:89; Casal Bértoa &
Mair 2010). This move from specific parties to systematic approach allows an explanation
for  the  continuous  existence  of  particular  set  of  parties  based  on  “constraints or
opportunities”  structure  within  the  system  (Bardi  &  Mair  2008:  153).  Although
competition has been a defining feature of party systems throughout the scholarship, arena
for  competition  and the  key competitors  were  novel  in  this  framework.  As  far  as  the
institutionalization  of  the  party  system  goes,  predictability and  stability of  inter-party
competition is the test of institutionalization. In the PSI scholarship authors usually refer to
these two elements when they talk about institutionalization (e.g. Huntington 1965, Mair
1996, Randall & Svasand 2002, Mainwaring & Torcal 2006, Casal Bértoa & Mair 2010
2010; Casal Bértoa 2015, Bielasiak 2002, etc.). However, it should be noted that PSI is not
a dichotomous concept, rather there are degrees to which party systems can be regarded
institutionalized.  Hence,  total  predictability  and  stability  although  do  show  absolute
institutionalization and the entire lack of these two aspect – non-institutionalization, it still
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leaves  plenty  of  room  for  the  degrees  to  which  predictability  and  stability  can  be
manifested in the party system. In order to understand where these two aspects fit in in the
party system paradigm, I will refer to Mair’s work.
Peter Mair (1996) argued that the cornerstone of party systems is the "stable  structure of
competition" (emphasis added). He put forth three factors which permit the assessment of
predictability  [of  stable  structures  of  competition]  i.e.  institutionalization  of  the  party
system: 
1. Alternation in government which illustrates how incumbent party/parties are replaced by
new [combination of] party/parties. There can be a total replacement i.e. the (1) wholesale
alternation; (2) partial alternation which takes place when number of former parties stay in
the office while some leave or are replaced in a new government; and (3) non-alternation –
the  same line-up of  parties  continue  to  form a  new government.  Thus,   the  focus  of
evaluation is alternation from one government to the next. Notably, the second pattern of
alternation which hints to the lower institutionalization, as Mair further points out, can be
observed in "fragmented system" (Mair 1996). However, the first and the third patterns can
be somewhat problematic and might require caution in order not to overestimate/ over-
reward  governing  status  of  a  party/parties.  Especially  if  the  partisan  composition  of
government is significantly low.
2. Another factor is an  innovation or familiarity of governing formulae. It concerns the
line-up of  parties  in  government,  whether  certain combination  of parties  has formed a
government before which would be the example of a familiar  formula, or it is a novel
government in the sense that this particular set of parties have never governed together
before. In order for a government to be considered innovative it does not require new set of
parties;  instead,  parties  which  have  governed  before  in  different  coalition  but  never
together also qualify as innovative. Although an addition of a new party would also make
government an innovative one (Mair 1996). However, it should be kept in mind, that this
feature of PSI also measures degree of institutionalization on continuous scale. It is best
reflected in the case when one coalition is replaced by another, which keeps number of
parties in place, but adds or replaces some with different parties. Here the parties which
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have been in government before count as a familiar share, while the new addition is an
innovative part of the whole share. Thus, both aspects are taken into consideration when
there are more than two parties in government.  Single-party government is much more
straightforward, since it is the case of either–or.
And finally, 3. there is the access to government. This aspect, similar to the second feature
of  PSI  looks  into  parties  in  government  over  time,  not  just  the  change  from  one
government to the next. And it assesses the closure or openness of the access. Although
Mair  clarifies  that  not  all  parties  can  be  expected  to  gain  access  to  government,  the
question he poses is somewhat ambiguous: "whether all  relevant parties eventually cross
the  threshold  of  government"?  (Mair  1996)  (emphasis  added).  Now  this  openness  or
closure of party systems is very important in narrowing down competing parties in the
governmental arena. However, Mair does not elaborate on what he means by "relevant
parties", or to pose the question differently, what is the criterion for relevance. Does he
follow Sartori and bring the ideological proximity in order to determine potential coalition
parties, or is it the relative assembly size of the party that should guarantee it a seat in a
new government (Siaroff (2006:1) in adopting numbers approach has set 3% representation
threshold in the assembly for the relevance of a party in the party system)? Answer to the
question of relevance of parties in the party system seems important in ascertaining when
the system can be considered closed and when the access is still open. In order to solve this
puzzle, we should keep in mind that party systems deal with party strategies.  While in
some cases ideological distance might keep some parties away from government,  other
times keeping the spoils to office within small number of familiar parties is "the strategy of
self-preservation"  (Mair  1996).  Since  neither  parliamentary  representation  nor  the
ideological  distance  necessarily  translate  into  obtaining  governing  status,  calculation
should  be left  to  more  neutral  aspect.  Closure of  the  party system would comprise  of
exclusion  of  some parties  from government  and  thus  alternation  between  parties  with
former governing status. Openness, on the contrary, would mean obtaining of this status by
a new party (see Casal Bértoa & Enyedi 2014: 267). 
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Mair's (1996) original framework was amended later by Casal Bértoa & Mair (2010). They
added the fourth criterion for assessing the degree of PSI. Notably, this supplementation
took place after looking into post-communist party systems where institutionalization was
lagging behind compared to the experience of older democracies. The added criterion was
4.  the frequency  of  change,  which  looks  into  "the  number  of  changes  in  the  party
composition  of  government",  whether  these  changes  take  place  post  or  in  between
elections (Casal Bértoa & Mair 2010).
What  looking  into  these  factors  tell  us  about  the  PSI  is  that  the  low rates  of  regular
government  turnovers  are  telling  signs  of  high  degree  of  institutionalization;  while
frequent,  in-between  election  partial  changes  and new players  popping up,  shows low
degree of institutionalization (Casal Bértoa & Mair 2010).
However,  these  criteria  leave  out  non-partisan  ministers  and  governments  from
consideration.  The reason for concentration on partisan ministers  was already provided
above, in party system definition. Party systems are about interactions between parties (see
Mair 1996), not between different actors. There are one of two ways this statement can be
interpreted. The first is to omit the non-systemic elements from the calculation as Casal
Bértoa, Mair et alia have done before; or we could consider further whether few partisan
ministers  in  largely  technocratic  government  can  represent  any structure  of  inter-party
competition. Irrespective of to whom the appointment powers fall, my understanding of the
structure of competition is derived, following Mair's logic (1996), from the idea that the
'governing  status'  is  the  objective  parties  pursue  and  thus  they  have  the  incentive  to
maximize the share of seats if it is up to them. To put it differently, if the competition or
cooperation  for  government  takes  place  between parties  the  governments  formed from
such interactions should be largely partisan.
Following the option one, of leaving the non-partisans out of the equation, Casal Bértoa
has ascribed higher degree of institutionalization to the Georgian party system compared to
the others in the Black Sea Region. The reason for this conclusion is that during the PP1
there was a single party represented in government along with non-partisans. Thus, Casal
Bértoa has argued that since the Revolution,  which also coincides with the democratic
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transition in this country, "party politics has been dominated" the political scene. Contrary
to  development  in  Ukraine,  where  "parties  played  a  secondary  role".  Thus  far,  the
assumption  regarding  the  non/partisan  status  of  the  government  has  been  based  on
somewhat  intuitive  judgment  regarding  the  cabinet  composition,  or  more  precisely,
whether most of the cabinets were composed of "majority of independent or non-partisan
(proximate to the President) political figures" (Casal Bértoa 2016: 121) (emphasis added).
This statement  seems bit  too obscure to let researches decide the partisan status of the
government. As a principle, it should not matter whether it is just one cabinet or many,
changes  or  non-changes  should  be  reflected  all  the  same.  Second,  there  is  no  clear
threshold for  each cabinet  in  terms  of  their  non-partisan  status;  whether  majority  here
means 80% or 51%? Neither is the rationale behind it explained, whether independents
sharing incumbent party views or policy preferences should be added to the calculation,
while  non-partisans  should not.  And lastly,  non-partisanship seems to be linked to  the
proximity to the president. It is not clear whether presidents' partisanship matters or it is his
appointment powers that make cabinets non-partysan.
Although inclusion of non-partisan cabinets risks penalizing party systems, the argument
for  inclusion  is  that  it  not  only increases  our  understanding of  what  these  differences
between semi-presidential sub-types bring to the table but also how repetitive the patterns
of  interactions  between  parties  have  become.  If  a  party  holds  only  a  small  share  of
government  seats  under  its  supposed single-party  government  and disappears  from the
political scene after new parties come to power, then perhaps accounting for these details is
what  allows  us  to  realistically  assess  the  situation,  not  overestimate  the  systematic
character of certain inter-party or inter-branch interaction.
In chapter one, where the differences between PP1 and PP2 sub-types were addressed it
was pointed out that due to the institutional set-up (not necessarily because of presidential
powers) parties' power to compete for governing status might be reduced in PP1 sub-type.
In order to find some delineation of what would count as partisan and, on the other hand, a
technocratic  or non-partisan government,  a threshold for "party government"  status has
been  introduced  in  this  study.  Schleiter  and  Morgan-Jones  have  proposed  a  way  to
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distinguish  between  two  types  of  cabinets:  presidential  and  parliamentary  ones.  They
conceptualize presidential cabinets as the ones "formed without active participation" of the
assembly parties or being composed of more than half (50% + 1) of non-partisan ministers
(Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2010: 1424). Following Schleiter and Morgan-Jones, I use
the 50% + 1 threshold to decide in favor of “party government”. Failing to meet this limit
would mean that competition for government is not inter-party. And thus, the competition
for government is less about the party system as such. The aim of this distinction is to
avoid  over-rewarding  or  over-stating  institutionalization  of  party  systems.  That  said,
parties  which  meet  this  criterion  will  qualify  as  100%  partisan  in  case  of  one  party
government; similarly,  under multi-party government the share will be divided between
partisan members and non-partisans will be excluded from the calculation.
2.3 Electoral systems
Inclusion  of  electoral  systems  in  the  current  study  might  appear  rather  redundant,
especially, by accepting Peter Mair's conceptual framework, it has been established that
patterns of inter-party interaction have their own logic,  independent of that of electoral
preferences. However, considering from the independent variable side it is interesting to
observe whether electoral rules correspond to the differences between semi-presidential
sub-types, i.e. is PP1 accompanied by more individual-centric rules, while the shift to PP2
follows more party-centric electoral rules as well? Although proportional representation
(PR)  is  regarded  to  be  more  party-centric  than  the  "candidate-based  multi-member
systems" (see Lin 2011: 64), certain rules in PR system can also work in advantage of
individualistic  politics.  Features of party versus individual-centric  PR rules are roughly
summarized in the table below.
Table, PR system
Individual-centric system Party-centric system
Open list, no vote pooling + MMD +/-
nomination powers
Closed list + MMD programmatic 
parties
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Closed list + SMD + nomination powers
Kitschelt et al. 1999: 54.
Under conditions when electoral rules become more party-centric we should also keep in
mind  the  possible  outcomes  of  these  rules;  such  as  increase  in  the  numbers  of  the
parliamentary  parties.  Such  changes  in  electoral  rules  pose  a  test  to  party  system
institutionalization;  whether  the  structure  of  competition  remains  the  same  after  the
introduction of more proportional electoral rules or as Mair proposed electoral preferences
will be managed according to the patterns of interactions between parties in party system.
However,  if  under  PP1  the  party  system has  remained  under-institutionalized  and  the
country shifts to PP2 with more proportional rules we might expect increase in the number
of parliamentary parties to contribute to the initial mitigation of the expected PP2 sub-type
effects. Since cabinet dismissal depends solely on the assembly, in high number of parties
no confidence vote might be easier to be pushed.
Therefore,  electoral  systems  serve  as  a  conditional  variable  in  this  study.  In  order  to
estimate full effect of institutional design of the regime type on PSI, the extent to which
these effects are either increase or mitigated by differences in electoral system is also taken
into consideration. 
Hypothesis: individual-centric rules under PP1 contribute to the lower institutionalization,
while  in  under-institutionalized  party  systems  shift  to  PP2  accompanied  by  the  party-
centric rules will experience initial decrease in PSI scores.
However, keeping in mind that ideal-typical models are seldom found in practice, looking
into electoral designs of the selected cases will help us to anticipate the kind of impact
conditional variable might have on PSI.
Table; Electoral systems design for the assemblies





Croatia 1992 – mixed plurality 
SMD and PR 1 
Btwn. 100-160 1992: SMD +
1 nationwide;
4 yrs. 3.4 yrs.
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nationwide.
1995 – Mixed, PR share 
increased.
2000 – list PR;
2011 – closed-list PR;
2015 – open-list PR.
2000: MMD
Georgia Mixed: party list PR + 
majority system
2004 -235; 





4 yrs. 4 yrs.




MMD 4 yrs. 3 yrs.
STP Closed-list PR. 55 MMD 4 yrs. 3.8 yrs.
Ukraine 1998: Mixed, closed-list 
PR + plurality SMD.
2006-7: closed-list PR;
2012: Mixed: closed-list 
PR + majority system
450 2006-7: 1 
nationwide;
1 Nationwide











Sources:  IDEA international's Electoral  System Design database; IFES Election Guide;
Inter-Parliamentary  Union;  Núñez,  L.,  Electoral  System Change in  Europe since 1945:
Portugal; Wikipedia.
Assemblies of the selected countries during the period under consideration are unicameral,
and the countries are unitary systems.
Given  certain  expectations  about  the  way  in  which  certain  electoral  systems  might
accelerate or mitigate the effect of PP1 and PP2 sub-types on PSI, we would expect across
the given set of cases that in Portugal & STP the effect would be accelerated because these
two countries had party-centric electoral systems from the beginning, while in Croatia and
to some extent in Ukraine the shift to PP2 is expected to experience an initial government
instability,  since the switched to  more party-centric  rules corresponded to the sub-type
change. Georgia,  similar to Portugal and STP maintained the electoral system in place,
however,  in  this  case  the  country  never  moved to  fully  PR system,  but  preserved the
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balanced mixed system. Thus, the mixed system is expected to weigh in and lessen the
benefits of the sub-type shift.
2.4 Control variable
In order to observe the proposed effects of semi-presidentialism on PSI, controlling for
democracy is paramount (see Elgie & Moestrup 2016: 2).  If the system is held closed
artificially  there  is  no  point  in  measuring  the  stability  of  competition  under  different
institutional  conditions.  In  order  to  ensure  that  the  selected  cases  meet  the  minimal
criterion  of the public  offices  are  freely contested  the index of electoral  democracy is
selected as a control variable. This index ensure that the selection of the executive and the
assembly  is  carried  out  in  competitive  elections  (Skaaning et  al.  2015);  looks into the
conduct of elections, whether it is free and fair; freedom of association, and expression are
guaranteed (Teorell et al. 2016).
3. Hypothesis
Above discussion suggests that party systems are institutionalized in a specific manner in
semi-presidentialism.  Keeping  the  above  conceptualization  of  variables  in  mind,  this
means  that  the  institutional  arrangements  in  the  two sub-types  of  semi-presidentialism
produce different patterns of interactions among parties in governing arena.
Under  the  first  sub-type  of  semi-presidentialism we should  expect  party  politics  to  be
somewhat secondary in the distribution of spoils of the office. To put it into Mair's terms I
hypothesize president-parliamnetarism to behave more as an open system, where cabinet
survival depends not only on the assembly but also on the president, even if he is partisan
and enjoys majority  support in the parliament  s/he is  still  expected to have a different
agenda.  Presidents  under  president-parliamentarism  somewhat  reduce  the  competition
from the core of party system. So, if the structure of competition is at the heart of party
systems  then  under-institutionalized  party  system  under  president-parliamentarism  is
hardly surprising.
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H: PP1 leads to lower PSI because of higher number of non-partisan cabinets and higher
frequency of change embedded in the institutional arrangement of PP1. In contrast, PSI
should increase with the shift to PP2 due to the accountability structure of this sub-type.
Thus,  while  PP1 creates  conditions  for  lower  institutionalization,  move to  PP2 should




In  addition,  electoral  systems  are  expected  to  further  influence  institutional  design
outcomes on PSI. The more individual-centric rules under PP1 are expected to increase the
regime type  effect  and further  contribute  to  the lower institutionalization  of  countries’
party system. Similarly, if country shifts to more proportional, party-oriented rules after the
shift  to  PP2,  which  was  preceded  by  lagging  institutionalization  due  to  PP1  sub-type
specificity and less party oriented rules, we should expect, at least, initial further opening
of the party system and lowering of the IGA. In contrast,  if party-centric rules were in
place since PP1, we should expect a smooth transition.
4. Research design
Casal Bértoa (2014a; 2014b) has addressed effects of different regime types on PSI. In
order to observe the outcomes all three regime types have on PSI, he uses combination of
most similar (MSSD) and a most different systems designs (MDSD). Although his analysis
is primarily a cross-country comparison, he also looks into the short, medium, and long-
term effects of regime types on PSI. However, semi-presidentialism is used as a single
variable, irrespective of institutional differences within it. Furthermore, long-term effects
which cover both sub-types, risk correcting lower institutionalization scores under PP1, or
averaging the effects of PP2 by calculating these two sets together.
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Taking into consideration an impact selected research method has on our understanding of
the effects semi-presidentialism has on PSI, the choice of method in this study tries to
account for the specificities of both phenomena under consideration. First, this study needs
to be carried out in a comparative perspective. As it has already been established earlier,
due to "heterogenous nature of semi-presidential countries" (Elgie 2011: 2) selection bias
and/or the problem of endogeneity can be avoided if the systematic differences within this
regime are captured and turned into useful comparative categories  (PP1 and PP2), and
these differences are demonstrated and compared.
Selection of the phenomenon and the research method best suited for the study determine
the nature of the study. It is a few-N, factor-oriented comparative analysis. However, the
aim of this paper/thesis is not only to compare few cases based on outcomes, but also to
trace the process of institutionalization of party systems, the way it unfolds under each sub-
type. Thus, it is more of a diachronic analysis, which I think, is well suited for testing the
hypothesis.  The  rationale  for  the  cross-temporal  analysis  is  that  it  increases  our
understanding  of  semi-presidentialism  and  the  way  party  systems  develop  patterns  of
interactions  in  this  regime.  Furthermore,  it  will  allow  us  to  give  recommendations
regarding improving the performance of PP1.
Case selection is based on two criteria. First, countries should have shifted from president-
parliamentary to premier-presidential system. Second, this shift should not be interrupted
(experience constitutional gap or intervening another regime type). In order for countries to
be  classified  as  semi-presidential  ones  the  constitutions  need  to  specify  and  meet  the
following criteria proposed by Elgie: 1) origin and survival of president (independent of
the assembly); 2) accountability of both prime minister and the cabinet to the assembly;
and 3) the assembly should be able not only to consent to president's request to appoint or
dismiss the government, but also to pass the vote of no confidence (closely follows Elgie
2011: 4–5). 
Some cases exhibit clear features of 'managed competition', for example Kyrgyzstan and
Armenia  (Lansford  2015).  By  contrast,  other  countries  have  had  back  and  forth  with
democratic progress and cannot be so easily dismissed.
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Graph, electoral democracy scores












Index of Electoral Democracy
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Source: Teorell et al. (2016, V-Dem Working Paper Series 2016:25); ("V-Dem Codebook
v8" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project 2018).
These filters leave us with the three solid, electoral democracies: Georgia, Portugal, and
São Tomé and  Príncipe.  Another  set  of countries  are Croatia,  and Ukraine.  These two
countries  have  transitioned  to  electoral  democracy  during  the  shift  to  premier-
presidentialism.
Table; shift from PP1 to PP2 in selected cases
Country president-parliamentarism premier-presidentialism
Croatia 1991–2000 2001 –
Georgia 2004–2013 2013 –
Portugal 1976–1982 1983 –
São Tomé and Príncipe 1991-2006 2006 –
Ukraine 1996–2006 2006 –
Source:  Elgie,  R.  (2018),  Semi-presidentialism,  premier-presidentialism  and  president-
parliamentarism  –  A  new  country-years  dataset  [Blog  post,  3  April].  Retrieved  from
http://presidential-power.com/?p=7869   .
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The rationale behind inclusion of Croatia and Ukraine is to observe results of the shift from
PP1  to  PP2,  whether  PSI  is  different  under  the  second  sub-type  due  to  recent
democratization, or still follows the trend.
5. Data collection
The data regarding countries with semi-presidential constitutions, which experienced the
shift from PP1 to PP2 was collected from Robert Elgie's dataset on semi-presidentialism.
Due to the fact that the current study is based on Elgie’s conceptual framework and follows
his classification of sub-types the existing data-set was deemed sufficient and suitable for
the purposes of the current study.
The Index of  Electoral  Democracy was taken from the  latest  data  version  (v8)  of  the
Varieties of Democracy Database.
For  the  dependent  variable  the data  was collected  from multiple  sources.  One general
reason is  the  diversity  of  cases;  another  reason was  to  maximize  accuracy.  The  most
extensive coverage of countries in terms of cabinet composition and party affiliation of
ministers  were  found  on  Casal  Bértoa's  Who  Governs  Europe,  Döring  and  Manow's
Parliaments and Governments Database, and on  Sonntag's Politica. Furthermore, if there
was conflicting information provided by different databases, country expert articles were
consulted.  However,  there  was  no  information  on  São Tomé e  Príncipe  (STP)  in  any
relevant database. The data on STP was collected from secondary sources.2
2  Lansford's Political Handbook of the World covered some of the cabinet composition
information. In addition numerous internet sources through internet archives and the Wikipedia were utilized.
But more importantly,  Dr.  Gerhard  Seibert  kindly shared his data on STP, which provided me with the
information regarding the number of ministers in each cabinet, parties in the cabinet, share of non-partisan
members, legislative support, etc.
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6. Operationalization of variables
The independent variable and its sub-types are assessed based on country constitutions.
As far as the dependent variable goes, PSI is operationalized as a continuous variable, as
proposed by Casal Bértoa and Enyedi (2014).
Calculation  of  PSI  starts  from the  first  assembly  election  after  the  adoption  of  semi-
presidential constitution; and the shift to PP2 – from the first cabinet formed under this
sub-type.
Analysis of PSI does not concern particular parties, rather it is carried out "at the systemic
level" (Casal Bértoa 2016/2017), where "years [are used] as time units and the percentage
of  ministers  as  counting  units".  This  way  all  three  aspects  of  Index  of  Government
Alternation (IGA) – wholesale,  partial,  and non-alternation are all accounted for  (Casal
Bértoa 2016: 120 – 121). Initially, Mair (1996), and Casal Bértoa & Mair (2010) following
Mair's  1996  operationalization  only  looked  into  the  changes  in  the  composition  of
government, although conceptually, IGA was designed to incorporate not only alternation,
but also non-alternation, and wholesale alternation, where the latter two were thought to
illustrate higher level of institutionalization. Although the original Index of Government
Alternation focused not only on the party replacement from government to government,
but also on the position parties occupied in each government (Casal Bértoa & Mair 2010),
this index used changes to demarcate time for analysis. Whereas, Casal Bértoa and Enyedi
(2014) turned PSI into a truly continuous variable by tracking non/changes on yearly basis
(see also Casal Bértoa 2016: 120). 
Still  the  question  remains  which  [partisan]  governments  should  be  considered  for
calculation? Casal Bértoa and Enyedi (2014) propose inclusion of governments following
assembly  elections.  Even  if  the  line-up  of  parties  remain  the  same,  changes  in  party
position each time will be reflected in the percentage change of partisan ministers in a new
government.  However,  they  maintain  Mair’s  original  position  in  excluding  changes  in
particular  PM  and  cabinet  between  elections  if  the  combination  of  governing  parties
remain unchanged. In case of partial-alternation, even if the PM remains the same, such
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government needs to be evaluated (Casal Bértoa and Enyedi 2014: 268). In addition and
taking constitutional requirements for government resignation into account, depending on
the sub-type and country specifications, constitution might require government resignation
following presidential, not the assembly elections, in such cases presidential elections will
be considered instead of the assembly and vice versa if the government resigns after every
assembly elections.
IGA evaluates ministerial volatility. 
Formula:
MV=½Σ (mt2–mt1).
Where: MV refers to ministerial volatility and is calculated based on changes in time t2
minus time t1, in absolute numbers. However, this score needs to be standardized since it is
measured from 50 to 100. In cases when the MV is < 50, the score is subtracted from 100.
Below is the final IGA formula proposed by Casal Bértoa (2016).
IGA = (MVis-50)*2.
Source:  Casal Bértoa, F. (2016): Database on WHO GOVERNS in Europe and beyond,
PSGo. Available at: whogoverns.eu.
The remaining two indicators are calculated from 0 to 100 (see Casal Bértoa 2016: 120 –
121;  Casal Bértoa & Enyedi 2014).  Hence,  evaluation of composed PSI score requires
standardization of IGA.
Innovation  and/or  familiarity  of  the  governing  formula is  measured  by  the  Index  of
Familiarity of Alternatives (IFA). In order to capture not only the number of innovative
parties in the governing formula, but also their relative weight in the party system, Casal
Bértoa & Enyedi advise for using the ministerial volatility, here as well. While the share of
familiar  parties  will  be  maintained  in  the  calculation  based  on  their  share  of  cabinet
members;  innovative  elements  will  also  benefit  from  the  exact  calculations.  Previous
calculation based on the number of parties in the government assumed that each party had
the same ‘presence’ in government (see Casal Bértoa 2016; Casal Bértoa & Enyedi 2014).
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And the final indicator, access to government uses the Index of Close (IC). Similar to the
operationalization of the previous indicator, this is also measured on 0 to 100 point-scale;
employs ministerial volatility to accurately estimate new-comers’ position (Casal Bértoa
2016; Casal Bértoa & Enyedi 2014).
Overall level of institutionalization is an average of the three indicators listed above.
Formula:
PSI=(IGA+IFA+IC)/3.
Source:  Casal Bértoa, F. (2016): Database on WHO GOVERNS in Europe and beyond,
PSGo. Available at: whogoverns.eu.
Concerning the control variable,  electoral democracy is measured on an interval scale in
the Varieties of Democracy data-set.
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7. Empirical analysis
In this part of the paper, empirical results of the cases are discussed. The structure is as
follows: first the semi-presidential  shift  is outlined,  followed by PSI results before and
after the shift; this part is followed by analysis of the hypothesized effects on the PSI.
Cases which registered higher institutionalization under both sub-types are discussed first,
followed by two cases where the PSI has improved significantly after the shift. And lastly,
an outlier case is presented.
As a general note, it should be clarified that there is no mention of semi-presidentialism in
the  constitutions  of  these  countries,  perhaps  this  also  contributes  to  conceptualization
difficulties for this regime type. 
7.1 Portugal
Portugal  adopted  the  first  semi-presidnetial  constitution  following  the  Carnation
Revolution,  which  also  marks  the  beginning  of  the  third  wave  of  democratization.
Characteristic  of  the  third  wave  transitions  it  was  a  pact,  or  a  compromise  between
different political forces. Direct elections of the president was introduced to "reward the
military for" "the toppling of the authoritarian regime" but also, to created an opportunity
for the 'civilianization' of presidency. Appointment and dismissal of the PM and a cabinet
originated from the president, however the assembly also had the dismissal power up to
1982.  In  the  1982  amended  constitution,  confidence  vote  from  the  assembly  was
incorporated in cabinet investiture.  Thus the survival of the PM and a cabinet  depends
solely on the assembly although the Constitution states that the government is responsible
both to the president and the assembly. Although the president still maintains nomination
powers, proposal needs to be originated from the assembly consultation. Furthermore, the
government resigns following assembly elections, giving primacy to the legislature over
the executive (Jalali 2011: 158-159, 162-164; Neto & Lobo 2008: 234, 238, 240; Art. 189-
195).
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In the table below, I present the results of the party system institutionalization under both
sub-types.
Table; Portuguese party system before and after the shift




1976-1982 83.4 64.7 78.5 75.5 3 2 of 6
1983 - 96 97.1 100 96.8 11 0
Overall, there has been an improvement in PSI, following the move to PP2. Although the
Portuguese party system did not suffer from the under-institutionalization under PP1 the
system has research almost perfect institutionalization after the shift to PP2.
All major political parties in the party system were formed during 1973-1974. Notably, this
is the period from 1974 Revolution to the final pacted transition to democracy. These new
parties, before they even started competition for government had to seek a compromise
with the military (Jalali 2011: 158). Their active presence in the political scene is reflected
not only in the constitutional amendment in 1982, but also incorporation of more party-
centric ]electoral] rules since the transition to democracy. Not only do the same parties
dominate  the  political  scene  even  today  but  the  access  to  government  has  become
completely closed since the shift to PP2 sub-type. In this sense lower score in governing
formula hints to the possibility of developing new cooperation between former opposition
groups.
In  order  to  determine  whether  the  proposed  institutional  vices  of  PP1  sub-type  were
present and contributed to lower institutionalization of the party system in the initial years
of  semi-presidentialism  we  need  to  examine  the  patters  that  emerged  from the  initial
interactions.
Non-partisan governments amounted to one-third of all governments formed under PP1.
Even though PP1 lasted only for seven years, from 1976 to 1982 (included) and one-third
means only two non-partisan governments, still, it illustrates inter-branch competition for
the government and an attempt by the president to put a technocratic cabinet in place. The
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two non-partisan governments represent an extreme case, both were 100% non-partisan,
formed at the same year. Notably, and contrary to Elgie's proposition, the president was
non-partisan  under  president-parliamentarism,  while  all  the  following  presidents  were
partisan. The reason in the first case is the military past of the first president, while the
following presidents were all civilian. Although in assessing PSI 50% and less are sorted in
the  same  category  and  does  not  make  difference  in  determining  the  level  of
institutionalization,  it  might  have  played  a  greater  role  in  the  short-lived  president-
parliamentarism. Country experts ascribe the shift to PP2 to the desire to "eliminate the
possibility of undisguised presidential governments" (Neto & Lobo 2008: 234, 240).
The initial PP1 years were accompanied by frequent alternations in government, not all due
to  disapproval  of  non-partisan  programmes  from  the  assembly  (see  Lansford  2015,
Portugal; Neto & Lobo 2008). While the president tried to increase his influence on the
government,  parliament  was  also  doing  the  same  on  its  end.  Hence  the  frequent
disapproval and alternations in government. Thus, the institutional set-up did reduce PSI in
PP1. However, it should also be noted, that from the stability perspective, appointment of
the cabinet, clearly in conflict with the interests of the other institution which has the equal
dismissal powers seems rather short-sighted.
After the shift to PP2 sub-type there were no non-partisan governments, although the share
of  non-partisan  ministers  has  increased  on  number  of  occasions  even  under  PP2.
Interestingly, this has been the case during the most stable governments when the cabinet
was able to hold the office throughout full electoral cycle without early elections. On all
occasions  it  was  single  party  government,  composed solely  of  PS members  (and non-
partisans)  when  the  share  of  non-partisan  members  in  government  exceeded  40% but
remained below 50%. It took place the first time after shift to PP2 in the second half of
1990s, notably during the short period when the PM and the president were from the same
party. The second time, when the country was returned to cohabitation. Thus, there are two
very different  circumstances  under which there has been a significant  increase in  non-
partisan share of cabinet ministers. As a general trend, however, since the shift to PP2 the
competition  for  government  seems to  have  become the  matter  of  interactions  between
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parties,  solely.  Portugal  actually  experienced  decrease  in  the  effective  number  of
parliamentary  parties  soon  after  the  shift  to  PP2,  despite  the  fact  that  the  country
maintained party-centric electoral rules throughout the regime (under the both sub-types)
(see  Neto  and Lobo  2009).  It  appears  the  constitutional  amendment  has  produced the
intended result of "'partification' of government" (Lobo 2005: 274). Elimination of non-
partisan cabinets can be traced to the institutional design of PP2 sub-type. More precisely,
the required confidence vote from the assembly which capped the possibility of non-party
elements making it to the government.
Although  Portuguese  party  system  has  become  highly  institutionalized,  frequent  early
elections are still quite common. The reason behind early parliament dismissals had been
the "breakdown of agreement within the assembly" in 1979, 1982, 1985, 1987, and 2001.
Furthermore, there have been two addition dissolutions in 2004 this was conditioned by the
unpopularity of the government and less a matter of instability (Jalali 2011: 166-167); and
again in 2011 due to parliamentary instability.  Even though the parties in party system
have  been  able  to  keep  the  access  to  government  closed,  this  success  has  not  been
automatically translated into the assembly stability. Although, as observed above, former
opposition parties have joined forces in government, not all interactions appear to be as
strong. 
Above theorized degree of institutionalization under each semi-presidential sub-type holds
true in this case. Under PP1 Portuguese party system remained less institutionalized with
new parties gaining access to government, experimenting with new governing formula and
partial,  in-between  election  alternations.  Two  non-partisan  governments  undoubtedly
contribute  to  the  openness  of  party  system  quite  immensely,  but  it  is  not  the  sole
weakening factor. The key institutional tensions built in PP1 are the root cause of lower
PSI. As far as PP2 sub-type goes, the system has remained closed, almost with the perfect
score.  Even  though  there  had  been  quite  a  few  early  assembly  elections,  sometimes
following an innovative governing formula (under PP1), but other times familiar or the
single-party government (under PP2). The access to government has been limited to the
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existing parties; alternation had been either wholesale or none, and the governing formula
had also remained familiar in PP2 sub-type.
7.2 São Tomé and Príncipe
STP adopted semi-presidential constitution in 1990, following the Portuguese model. The
origin and survival of the president comes from the direct elections, serves for fixed term.
The president has appointment and dismissal powers of the PM and the cabinet. Also, the
Constitution (art. 68) declares it incompatible with the president’s office to hold any other
public or private office concurrently (Seibert 2009:207; 2007: 50; 2016: 996). This means,
formally s/he cannot hold a party position.
Following the  constitutional  amendment  of  2003 (which  came into  force  in  2006) the
country  moved from PP1 to  PP2 sub-type.  The president  could  no longer  dismiss  the
government at will after the shift, rather the survival of the PM and the cabinet has become
the assembly responsibility (Seibert 2003: 246; 2016: 997; 2009: 213-214).
Table: PSI scores of São Tomé e Príncipe




1991-2005 83.8 74.2 88.5 82.2 4 1 of 10
2006- 93.6 98.6 100 97.4 3 0 of 6
Similar to Portugal, STP has maintained party-centric rules since the adoption of semi-
presidential constitution. This way the initial instability of moving from one party to multi-
party system is contained in the PP1 sub-type, while the shift to PP2 becomes electorally
and institutionally party-oriented, i.e works in advantage of PSI after the shift.
Despite  the  fact  that  STP  adopted  Portuguese  constitutional  model,  both  countries
experienced increase of PSI and the party system closure after the shift to PP2, STP’s party
system was also quite institutionalized during PP1 sub-type.
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Contrary to Portugal, institutional shortcomings of PP1 are felt to a lesser extent in STP.
While Portugal followed a zero-sum game between the executive and the assembly for
government posts, in this case government appointment was more a result of inter-branch
negotiations. Governments formed by the presidential initiative were not common under
PP1. It only took place on rare occasions. The president nominated PM candidate after
consultation with the assembly parties. Therefore, the dismissal of the cabinet and the PM
by the assembly took place once during PP1 period (Seibert 2009: 204, 220; 2016: 997).
Furthermore,  the  non-partisan  share  of  cabinet  ministers  have  also  been  quite  low
throughout the entire period of semi-presidentialism in STP, all the cabinets formed so far
have been strictly partisan with one exception. Notably, this presidential government was
formed under PP1 sub-type.
As far as the government dismissal goes from president’s side, this has happened when
there  was  a  single-party  governments  in  office.  Single-party  governments  contrary  to
coalitions  are  quite  rare  and  among  these  rare  instances  two  were  dismissed  by  the
president;  the very first  cabinet  comprising of PCD members,  and the second in 2001.
Arguably the latter dismissal was the last straw in tolerating presidential meddling in the
stability  of  government.  It  prompted  assembly  parties  to  work  on  the  constitutional
amendment to increase assembly control (Seibert 2009: 205, 211).
However, it was not frequent government alternations which led to lower PSI scores under
PP1, as noted above, these were rare cases. Instead, it was innovative governing formula,
which dragged the scores down. During PP1 there were also more instances of partial-
alternation between elections. This dynamic has significantly changed in PP2, where the
alternation  is  predominantly  wholesale.  Furthermore,  coalition  partners  are  either
composed of the same line-up of parties or maintain two major former coalition partners.
The reason for this is that the line-up of major parties has not changed much since the
adoption of semi-presidentialism. There have been occasional name changes in parties but
the  continuity  has  not  been  disrupted.  The  close  of  access  to  government  certainly
underlines this fact. 
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During the early 2000s there have been few attempts at forming governments proportional
to the assembly representation. Despite reaching unprecedented high level of support from
the assembly these governments did not prove to be stable; quite the contrary, they were
rather short-lived, lasted only for few months. Perhaps, such attempts to replicate assembly
representation in the government upsets the pattern of interactions between parties. This
leaves  out  the  opposition  and  changes  dynamics  of  the  competition.  Tries  to  bridge
governmental and electoral arenas, which might work against the party system, because
doing  so  would  open  the  door  to  the  non-systemic  elements  to  affect  the  patterns  of
competition. This on the other hand would lead to de-institutionalization of party systems.
Contrary to Portugal, where usually PSD + CDS, and PS governments alternate, there is no
clear major alliance emerging in STP's party system. Governments are formed from the
former opposition groups, as well as from the former partners, single-party governments
have allied with their former opposition parties as well. Due to the fact that there are three
major parties still in the competition, governing formula but especially the access to the
government has remained closed in PP2.
Overall, STP’s party system has been highly institutionalized under both sub-types, it still
displayed visible  improvements  in the structure of interaction between parties after  the
shift. The fact that STP has withstood prolonged periods of cohabitation (Lin 2011: 146)
might be the result of the high level of PSI.
7.3 Georgia
The country adopted semi-presidential constitution in 2004 after the Rose Revolution. The
first step was towards president-parliamentarism, but the constitution was amended soon,
in  2010  in  favor  of  premier-presidentialism,  which  took  effect  in  2013  presidential
elections. Although the regime type – semi-presidentialism is not explicitly stated in the
constitution,  institutional  design  outlined  in  chapter  one  is  met  in  the  amended
constitutions of 2004 and 2010. The president is,  again,  directly  elected for fixed term
(Georgia had presidential system prior to the Revolution); the origin of the government
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came from the president, therefore the government had an obligation “to resign following a
presidential election”, not the parliamentary one. The survival of the prime minister and a
cabinet under these circumstances was dependent on the both, president and the parliament
(2004), and later (2013) exclusively on the assembly (Nakashidze 2016: 125–126). In the
latter case, although the president nominates a prime minister, the proposal comes from the
assembly and the nomination of the government also before the assembly falls to the PM
(Art. 80, 81).
In order  to observe the extent  to  which hypothesized effects  are present in this  case I
present PSI scores before and after the shift to PP2 in the table, below.
Table; PSI scores of the Georgian party system3
years IGA IFA IC PSI score No. Of 
elections
No. Of non-p 
cabinets
2004-2012 68.8 43.8 56.3 56.3 1 pres. 3 of 8
2013 - 87 90 90 89 1 parl. 1 of 6
Significant  improvement  in  party  system  institutionalization  after  the  shift  to  PP2  is
observed from the table, above. Despite the fact that the time-span, especially for the PP2
sub-type has been rather  short  in  this  case,  hypothesized patterns  have emerged in the
governing arena.
As expected, under PP1 more governments were formed, in general, and also, the number
of  non-partisan  governments  was  higher  in  this  sub-type.  The  choice  of  semi-
presidentialism in the wake of the Rose Revolution has been claimed to be the by-product
of  the  Revolutionary  dynamics,  to  wit,  that  it  could  formally  guarantee  the  power/
authority to the Revolutionary leaders. “The presidency, premiership, and chairmanship of
the legislature went to the three main leaders behind” the Rose Revolution (Nakashidze
2016: 218). After all, semi-presidentialism incorporates a dual executive system with the
president and a prime minister along with the cabinet, sharing the executive power (see
3  Few changes were made in partisan composition to the original data compiled by Casal 
Bértoa. I marked PM or a cabinet member as partisan based on my own knowledge and confirmed through 
various internet sources.
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Elgie 2011: 14). Despite partisanship of the three leaders of the Revolution and the fact
that their merged party held the majority in the assembly, did not guarantee the governing
status for the party (ENM). In fact, the first cabinets formed under the “power-sharing”
circumstances  were  non-partisan.  Based on the  theoretical  expectations  outlined  in  the
chapter  one,  institutional  features  of  president-parliamentarism  makes  non-partisan
governments  more  likely  to  be  formed  in  this  sub-type.  Therefore,  lowering  the
institutionalization score of the party system was largely originated from the non-partisan
governments.  Despite  the fact  that  throughout  PP1 one party,  ENM, had the assembly
majority and enjoyed the governing status, its share of office was as low as the one-third of
the  cabinet  at  times.  Moreover,  although  single-party  government  makes  frequent
government  alternation  hard to  be accounted  for,  alternation  between non-partisan  and
partisan status, due to its share of ministers provides with a tool to account for significant
changes in government which take place between elections and by definition contribute to
the reduction of the institutionalization score.
Although the instability/ frequent changes of PMs after the passing of the PM Zhvania, one
of the leaders of the Rose Revolution and the first PM under PP1 had been increased,
lowering  the  IGA,  it  was  less  a  result  of  a  dissolution  of  the  initial  power-sharing
arrangement  rather  these  changes  were  seen  as  “pawn  sacrifices”  during  president-
parliamentarism. There were prolonged rallies against the president and the government in
2007-2008. Replacing the partisan PM with the non-partisan PM Gurgenidze was seen as
an attempt to ease the pressure on the incumbent government. Arguably, this represents an
example, when the president pursuing his own agenda to preserve his position, diverges
from the party interests. The extent to which these rallies challenged the legitimacy of the
president  can  be  observed  through the  fact  that  President  Saakashvili  called  for  early
[presidential] elections in 2008 (Nakashidze 2016: 132, 131). The partisan status of the
ENM started to increase in his second term, after the rallies.
The  constitution  was  amended  during  the  second  and  final  term  of  Saakashvili’s
presidency. With the reelection off  the table securing party position became a priority.
Before the parliamentary elections he appointed the leader of the ENM party as a prime
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minister with a partisan cabinet composed of vastly ENM members. Although, it proved to
be a rather short-lived win for the party; parliamentary elections of October 2012 brought a
new victorious party and a new PM with it. This short history proves that the president's
separate origin and survival do matter in how the PMs and cabinets are appointed, while
under premier-presidentialism PMs indeed were appointed from the leading party in the
legislature,  shifting the focus from the executive to the legislature (along with the shift
from one sub-type of semi-presidentialism to the other).
Since  2013  the  president  of  Georgia  is  an  independent,  in  line  with  Elgie's
conceptualization.  Although  the  current  president  was  briefly,  before  the  presidential
election,  a  member  of  KODS coalition  government,  he  also  served as  an  independent
minister under PM Ivanishvili's cabinet.
The shift brought the coalition government in power. However, parliamentary elections
preceded  presidential  elections,  which  brought  the  constitutional  changes  in  effect.
Therefore,  the  old  government  was  replaced  in  its  entirety  under  PP1,  while  partial
alternations  occurred  during  PP2.  Despite  these  changes  in  government,  overall  score
continued to increase. Casal Bértoa and Enyedi’s (2014) proposed model of measuring PSI
based  on  ministerial  volatility  which  assesses  all  indicators,  does  not  penalize  party
systems for irregular/frequent but minor government alternations. In this case, the share of
such parties was significantly low to impede on the overall score dramatically.
Contribution of indexes are diverse under PP1 and PP2. While the IGA was the highest in
the former, after the shift alternation index became the lowest of the indicators although it
has improved compared to PP1. The familiarity of governing alternatives and the access
scores were aligned under PP2 and exceeded the IGA. Although it  was only one party
included  in  government  under  PP1,  the  innovation  was  caused  from  non-partisan
governments. Innovation and familiarity further differ in this sub-type, since single-party
government allowed for higher party system close even with non-partisan cabinets. While
under PP2 the governments formed at a later point in time were composed of the familiar
line-up of parties, although on two occasions a party was left out of the government, no
new parties were added.
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As far as the electoral system goes, Georgia had a mixed electoral system under the both
sub-types,  which stresses enduring individual-centric  politics.  There was also one non-
partisan government under PP2 although unexpected after the shift.
7.4 Ukraine
Semi-presidential  regime  was  adopted  in  Ukraine  in  1996.  The  Constitution  made
provisions for direct-elections of the president. Appointment of the PM and the cabinet fall
to the president (Matsuzato 2011: 200).
Constitutional amendment of 2004 (which took effect in 2006) maintained the origin and
survival  structure for  president,  while  appointment  of  the cabinet  became an assembly
prerogative.  The Constitution was also clear  with regard to dismissal of the PM and a
cabinet,  which also became solely an assembly  responsibility.  Although the cabinet  of
ministers  is  accountable  to  both,  president  and the assembly,  only the latter  maintains
power to  dismiss  the cabinet.  Furthermore,  the cabinet  resigns following the assembly
elections (Art. 113-115).
As far as the effects of these changes on PSI are concerned, below are listed the results of
institutionalization prior and after the shift.
Table; Ukraine's PSI results




1996-2005 48.6 45.2 45.3 46.4 2 8 of 14
2006 - 84.8 81.6 86.6 84.3 4 1 of 12
Ukraine had the least institutionalized party system under PP1 sub-type among the selected
cases. This is also the country which benefits from the separation of PP1 and PP2 sub-
types the most. As it is clear from the table above, during PP2 inter-party competition has
shown  a  significant  improvement.  However,  despite  significant  differences  in  overall
results, certain aspects remain still problematic in PP2.
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Despite  certain  improvements  in  PP2 sub-type,  alternation  in  government  still  remains
high.  The  difference  between  the  two  sub-types  is  that  the  large  part  of  under-
institutionalization in PP1 was because of the sheer number of non-partisan cabinets. The
share of such cabinets reached 57.1% in PP1, while under PP2 it accounted for only 8.3%
of all governments. Thus, the trend of non-partisan governments in Ukraine corresponds to
the sub-type peculiarities. However, cabinets were composed of five or six parties at a
time, with some non-partisan members, under these conditions, the share of each party was
spread so thinly that the inclusion or exclusion of new parties in the government affected
the Index of Government Alternation to a lesser extent, even though the formula remained
quite innovative and closely intertwined with the [open] access to government (in the first
sub-type). The sheer number of parties in the party system remained high up until 2010
when it started to decrease slightly. It has been observed across the cases in the current
study that the increase in PSI, especially after the shift, is accompanied by the decrease in
the number of parties in party system. In this sense, Ukraine also follows the general trend,
although its PSI level should be considered carefully.
In terms of electoral systems, Ukraine only had the pure PR system short, during 2006 –
2007  assembly  elections,  but  this  change  did  not  necessarily  increase  the  number  of
competing parties in government. Before and after these two elections Ukraine employed
mixed electoral rules, similar to Georgia.
Although during PP2 parties started to become relevant, in general the trend of one-seat
parties (occasion when a party is granted one seat in one government but is common to
dismiss  such  parties  from  the  coalition  in  the  next  cabinet)  continued.  Due  to  such
additions governing formula underwent more changes than any other indexes. In this sub-
type familiarity and access to government were quite distinct. Even though the partisan
governments during the second part of PP1 and those of the first part of PP2 show more
similarities, one leading party with four or five minor satellites alternating around them.
Thus, although overall sub-type one and sub-type two produce quite different results, very
much in line with what was hypothesized in earlier, still Ukraine's case shows a different,
three types of developments in the competition.
44
7.5 Croatia
Croatia adopted president-parliamentary system in 1991, with dual accountability of the
prime minister  and a cabinet  to the president  and the assembly.  In 2000 constitutional
amendment president had the power to appoint the prime minister but the latter required
confidence-vote, exclusively from the assembly. Linked to the confidence vote, the cabinet
also nominated by PM, was appointed by the assembly, which for the survival depends on
the assembly since 2000 (Art. 110-111).
Table institutionalization of the Croatian party system





1992- 1999 100 100 100 100 3 0
2000 - 94.6 77.9 92.9 88.5 6 0
Croatia is an outlier in the study. It illustrates reverse effects. The party system under PP1
was closed and perfectly institutionalized,  while the institutionalization score decreased
after the shift.
Under  PP1  Croatia  had  one  dominant  party  in  government,  which  stayed  in  power
throughout the period, with very low non-partisan ministers. Thus, the system remained
closed with no alternation in government, throughout the period. Although Georgia also
had one dominant party during PP1, the results of these two countries are very different.
Croatian party system did not experience the same inter-branch struggles or pushing of
presidential agenda at the expense of party interests.
The switch to premier-presidentialism was accompanied by democratization, improvement
in economic performance, adoption of more party-centric electoral rules and the decrease
in  the  party  system  institutionalization.  Although,  party-centric  rules  could  have
contributed to the initial instability of the government, as well as democratization; it should
also be noted that Ukraine did not have high electoral democracy scores throughout both
sub-types  but  the  results  were  more  or  less  aligned  with  the  results  of  other  cases.
45
Improving democratic performance although should not be ignored, differences Croatia's
results should not be dismissed solely on this ground either.
The initial period of PP2 system proved quite unstable. Six parties replaced HDZ, but this
new coalition did not prove to be especially  stable.  Years following the first assembly
elections  under  this  sub-type  witnessed  experimentation  with  innovative  governing
formula and a group of parties gaining access to the government. With time this effect has
decreased. Croatia's HDZ party, which held the governing status during PP1 sub-type did
not disappear after the opposition took over. It still continues to form government with a
set  of countries  and also alone.  In  recent  years,  the party system produced two major
parties SDP along with HDZ, which alternate in government with a small number of minor
coalition partners. Although the access to government has closed again, due to the sheer
amount of parties which originally gained access to government after the shift, governing
formula is still innovative at times.
This case along with Georgia's  transition from one type of semi-presidentialism to the
other only demonstrates, how underdeveloped opposition can contribute to the lowering of
the PSI levels.  Even though there are striking differences between these two countries,
electoral democracy scores; the fact that Croatia adopted more party-centric electoral rules,
while  Georgia  practically  maintained  the  same  mixed  system  even  after  the  switch.
However, both countries experienced an initial period of coalition stabilization struggles
during PP2. Because Croatia adopted premier-presidential constitution as early as 2000,
patters of inter-party interactions are becoming more concrete.
If we compare PP1 and PP2 only based on the PSI scores we will observe a decrease in the
level  of  institutionalization  in  Croatia.  But  taking  into  account  free  contestation  of
elections  and  a  proportional  electoral  system  which  were  only  becoming  part  of  the
political process in Croatia, weight in on significant deviation of this case.
Despite the institutional conditions during PP1 and more individual-centric electoral rules,
Croatia party system was fully institutionalized under this sub-type, while the decrease in
PSI  took  place  after  the  shift.  Croatian  case  somewhat  undermines  the  hypothesis
regarding  the  effects  of  institutional  design  on PSI.  However,  electoral  system played
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produced expected initial instability in PP2 sub-type. Thus, overall, if we compare the first




Significance of semi-presidential institutional design has been questioned number of times
and hypotheses were put forth, arguing that it was less due to the institutional set-up, but
more about the party affiliation of the president that really affected the share of partisan
cabinet  members.  Almeida  and Cho (2007:  21)  have proposed that  under  non-partisan
president  39%  of  ministers  are  expected  to  be  non-partisan,  whereas  the  longer  the
president  has been associated  with a  party the lower the share of non-partisan cabinet
members there would be. Contrary to this assumption and based on the evidence from the
cases above, I argue that the difference between the two sub-types on the institutional level
produces rather similar outcomes irrespective of behavioral factors. Both in Portugal and
Georgia there were non-partisan cabinets during PP1, although in the former's case it was
an extreme example, president's party affiliation did not increase ENM's partisan share in
government in the latter.  Furthermore, as we have observed in the conceptualization of
semi-presidentialism  in  chapter  1,  presidents  are  expected  to  be  non-partisan  under
premier-presidentialism, following Almeida and Cho (2007) we should also expect low
party  involvement  in  government  under  PP2,  which  definitely  is  not  the  case,  due  to
incentives institutional set-up brings in. Throughout the thesis, I tried to draw a clear line
between  the  two  sub-types  of  semi-presidentialism  and  argued  that  we  should  expect
higher partisan composition under premier-presidentialism, despite (or because of) a non-
partisan president and thus, we can talk about party systems as such under this sub-type,
more than under PP1.
Furthermore, working on the relevant literature confirmed that semi-presidential cases are
usually studied under the pure presidential or parliamentary systems, which on occasions
even led to the inconclusive results or led scholars to adopt complex behavioral approach
instead  of  constitutional/institutional  power  divisions  (Shleiter  &  Morgan-Jones  2009;
Shleiter & Morgan-Jones 2010). I find the latter approach rather problematic, since it risks
understanding  issues  on  case  to  case  basis  and  ignores  the  underlying  institutional
principles at work.
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Overview of the literature on semi-presidentialism, especially case studies on the countries
covered in this study have provided with different explanations, mostly behavioral, as to
why the regime experienced instability in governments, frequent cabinet alternations, or
why popularly elected presidents pushed for technocratic or also referred to as "friends of
the president" cabinets,  which also did not last  long due to assembly rejection of their
government  programmes.  Although these historical  perspectives  are  certainly  insightful
and gives us a sense of what transpired, one thing remains clear, at least among most of the
cases examined here, that these trends of weak institutionalization are common under PP1,
all due to the institutional design, irrespective of circumstances on the ground. I argue that
circumstances do not really provide an answer as to why the structure of competition was
linked to parties under PP2, although they elaborate or tell a story eloquently, they do not
serve as explanations, but the institutional set-up does.
Differences  in  results  between  the  current  study  and  other  similar  studies  lies  in  two
aspects. The first is the research method employed in the current study, which is directly
connected  to  the  independent  variable,  or  rather  studying  it  from  the  sub-types’
perspective. I think the cases have benefited from differentiation from PP1 and PP2 sub-
types. And another reason for divergent results is modification of the assessment model,
inclusion of the non-partisan cabinets in PSI calculations.
For instance, in Casal Bértoa’s study (2016) Georgia and Ukraine are polar opposites. The
former  is  depicted  as  highly  institutionalized  system,  while  the  latter,  under-
institutionalized.  In  the  current  study,  in  contrast,  they  illustrate  more  similar  trend.
Although  Casal  Bértoa  uses  semi-presidentialism  as  a  single  variable,  the  key
differentiating factor is the issue of inclusion/exclusion of non-partisan governments. In
the  current  study,  due  to  theoretical  expectation  based  on  PP1  institutional  design,
inclusion of non-partisan governments  was seen as necessary.  While  in Casal Bértoa’s
study shows different results, due to exclusion of non-partisans.
Empirical results largely support the hypothesis with the exception of Croatia. This means
that  the  specific  institutional  design of  semi-presidential  system sub-types  produce  the
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proposed outcomes despite significant differences between countries, at least in electoral
democracies.
Differences  between  the  selected  countries  should  also  be  noted.  Economically  these
countries are on different development levels.










































Source: The World Bank.
What this graph illustrates is a more or less similar starting conditions (economically) even
though nowadays Portugal and Croatia have become much more prosperous. It is worth
noting  that  economic  improvement  in  these  two  countries  coincides  with  the  shift  to
premier-presidentialism,  this  is  also true in the case of Ukraine to some degree,  while
Georgia’s economic performance started to improve under president-parliamentarism. And
there are no significant differences registered in the case of STP.
Portugal and STP are the extreme cases.  There is clearly a pattern in economic prosperity
within the selected countries, which does not necessarily correspond to the institutional
outcomes.  On  the  contrary,  Portugal  and  STP  have  demonstrated  the  most  similar
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outcomes in  PSI improvement  after  the shift  to PP2. Moreover,  STP has  shown more
party-centric approach throughout semi-presidentialism.
In terms of economic prosperity,  PSI tends to take its  own course in semi-presidential
countries.  Even  STP  has  highly  institutionalized  party  system,  despite  the  economic
conditions. Furthermore, Portugal and STP show rather similar level of institutionalization,
but in terms of economic performance these two countries represent two extreme cases of
the upper and the lower economies in my selected cases. Croatia has a reverse trend, it was
poorly performing economically under PP1, while maintaining a closed party system and it
started improving economically, while its PSI score lowered but it was not a dramatic drop
and is still a highly institutionalized system. What we need to keep in mind in this case is,
again, democratization, which only took place later in Croatia. So, economic prosperity
seems  to  be  a  secondary  factor  and  the  selected  cases  represented  the  same  trend,
irrespective of significant economic differences.
The current paper tries to tackle two problems: analytical/theoretical and social relevance
(see Lehnert et al. 2007: 23-28) of the phenomenon studied here. Theoretically, there was
an  attempt  to  show  significant  differences  within  semi-presidentialism,  and  also  to
incorporate the missing, institutional specific (non-partisan cabinets) aspect in PSI index.
Taking  into  consideration  regular,  that  post-election  government  alternation  is  a
characteristic  of  more  institutionalized  party  system,  this  aspect  significantly  improves
government accountability. And perhaps, these findings can be of some interest. However,
the question is, however well supported by the empirical findings these claims might, do
these  findings  have  only  limited/narrow  political  influence  on  the  immediate  parties
involved, or whether these sentiments are shared among voters in shifting their priorities
from president’s  office  to  the  assembly  in  elections,  corresponding  the  shift  in  semi-
presidentialism?
Given the institutional design, president's post seems rather important in distribution of
seats in government under PP1, whereas under PP2 parties come to the forefront of the
competition  and hence the assembly  elections  are  important.  Following Mair  (1996),  I
emphasize the influence of highly institutionalized party system on electoral preferences,
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as has been clearly demonstrated in Portugal's case where highly proportional  electoral
rules did not increase fragmentation, rather the competition remained closed and between
familiar  parties.  That  said,  based on government's  performance  voters  might  decide  to
reward or to punish the incumbent government. Considering that 'PM and the assembly are
collectively'  accountable  to  the  assembly  and the president  under  PP1,  for  voters  both
elections remain relevant. Conversely, under PP2, it is the assembly elections that matters,
due to government's sole accountability to the former. Looking into voter turnout shows
that  voters  in  Georgia and  São Tomé and Príncipe have clearly  shifted their  priorities
corresponding to the sub-type change. Portugal displays a distinct trend, there have been
slight  spikes of  turnout  in  every other  presidential  election,  which closely  followed or
slightly exceeded turnout in parliamentary elections. However, it should also be noted that
since 1976, every president has been reelected and the rise in turnout coincided with the
first term elections. As far as Croatia and Ukraine go, they illustrate reverse trends. In the
former turnout in presidential elections have always been lowers, whereas in Ukraine it
was parliamentary elections that received lower interest among voters.
Thus, the current topic can be studied from the social perspective as well. 
Overall, differentiation between sub-types seems to have paid off. Even though, the set of
countries which underwent the shift is quite limited, I think general patters are still visible
which holds true to majority of cases. Research design further permitted capturing PP1 and
PP2 institutional influences on PSI scores as well as how institutional characteristics have
become embedded in party interactions.  Although the increase in  institutionalization  is
present numerically, that is not the only effect semi-presidential sub-types have ‘imposed’
on respective party systems.  Furthermore, countries with similar electoral systems have
produced  different  outcomes.  For  instance,  contrary  to  Portugal,  Georgia,  or  Ukraine
institutional shortcomings of PP1 are felt to a lesser extent in STP, although still present.
While Portugal followed a zero-sum game between the executive and the assembly for
government  posts,  in  STP government  appointment  was  more  a  result  of  inter-branch
negotiations. Governments formed by the presidential initiative were not as common under
PP1. The president nominated PM candidate after consultation with the assembly parties.
52
Furthermore,  the  non-partisan  share  of  cabinet  ministers  have  also  been  quite  low
throughout the entire period of semi-presidentialism in STP. What STP illustrates is that
the proposed ideal-typical effects cannot be expected to be present uniformly among all
cases.
Across the cases, with the exception of Croatia, innovative governments are more frequent
under PP1 sub-type, while the shift to PP2 causes farther closure of the access. Under PP1
IFA was the lowest, while under PP2 IC reaches the highest point.
All in all,  I  think,  the cases analyzed above demonstrate that measuring PSI separately
under each sub-type of semi-presidentialism gives us a certain advantage of catching a
trend of increase of the level of institutionalization under the second sub-type. And also,
the way party system mimics institutional design. Despite high institutionalization of the
party system, it can still  be improved institutionalization by switching to PP2 sub-type,
STP and Portugal can serve as examples.
It can be argued based on the results that in general, PSI is higher under PP2 sub-type,
always above 80 in the examined cases. The cases of Ukraine and Georgia where we have
observed significant improvement in PSI scores best illustrate the benefits of the shift from
PP1 to PP2. Therefore, one conclusion from these results can be, that countries suffering
from under-institutionalized party systems under PP1 sub-type, should perhaps consider
switching to PP2.
Considering that under PP2 party system institutionalization was generally high across the
selected  cases  another  direction  the current  paper  can be developed is  to  test  whether
premier-presidentialism  produces  highly  institutionalized  party  systems  not  just  in
comparative perspective but also in absolute terms. As opposed to, the more individual-
centric president-parliamentarism.
Despite Croatia and STP, where the former demonstrated that total institutionalization is
possible  under  PP1,  and  the  latter’s  case  which  showed  that  institutionally  embedded
system of cooperation between conflicting bodies can mitigate the detrimental effects of
PP1 sub-type, it can still be beneficial for the party system if PP2 institutional design was
53
in place instead of PP1. This conclusion, of course, also challenges the assumption that
semi-presidential systems are in general bad for democratization, PSI, or stability. Even
though Croatia challenge the claim of increase in institutionalization, still the switch did
not cause de-institutionalization of Croatian party system.
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9. Acronyms4
PCD - Partido de Convergência Democrática (Democratic Convergence Party; split from
MLSTP-PSD).
PCD-GR -  Partido  de  Convergência  Democrática-Grupa  de  Reflexão  (Democratic
Convergence Party-Reflection Group; split from MLSTP-PSD, renamed PCD).
CDS - Partido do Centro Democrático Social (Social Democratic Center Party, est.1974).
PSD - Partido Social Democrata (Social Democrat Party, est.1974 as PPD [Partido Popular
Democrático], 1976 renamed PSD).
ENM - Ertiani Natsionaluri Modzraoba (United National Movement, est. Oct 2001).
KODS -  Kartuli  Otsneba  –  Demokratiuli  Sakartvelo  (Georgian  Dream  –  Democratic
Georgia, est. 21 Apr 2012).
HDZ – Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica (Croatian Democratic Union, est.17 Jun 1989).
4  Sources: Worldstatesmen.org, Wikipedia.
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